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Abstract 
The efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent suffers from two key problems; causal indeterminacy, and a dependence 
on the political will of states, particularly the permanent five members of the Security Council. The vast array of factors 
which can be cited as potentially contributing to the outbreak of conflict and atrocity crimes mitigates against the de-
termination of definite “conflict triggers”. This does not mean prevention is impossible but does limit the efficacy of 
“early warning systems”. The dynamics of the “four crimes” within R2P’s purview further limits the efficacy of preven-
tion as the decision to engage in mass atrocities is taken in response to a perceived existential crisis. This significantly 
limits the scope for leveraging the “internal” aspect of R2P as the decision to commit these acts is invariably born from 
a belief that no other option is available to the potential aggressors. Thus the specifics of atrocity crime prevention 
places great emphasis on the operationalisation of the external dimension of R2P, namely the role of the international 
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1. Introduction 
This article argues that the Responsibility to Prevent, 
though vaunted as the most useful element of the Re-
sponsibility to Protect (R2P), has limited potential effi-
cacy. The Responsibility to Prevent suffers from two 
key problems; first the efficacy of prevention generally 
is undermined by causal indeterminacy. This problem is 
accentuated in the context of the Responsibility to Pre-
vent due to the specifics of atrocity crimes—in terms of 
the conditions under which they are perpetrated—and 
the related mechanisms by which such acts—when in 
gestation—can be prevented. This latter fact leads to 
the second problem, namely that the Responsibility to 
Prevent depends ultimately upon the political will of 
states, and especially the national interests of the per-
manent five members of the Security Council (P5).  
This article begins by charting the evolution of the 
Responsibility to Prevent before turning to an analysis 
of the literature on prevention strategies. Here I 
demonstrate that the array of factors which can plau-
sibly be cited as contributing to the outbreak of conflict 
and atrocity crimes is so vast it mitigates against the 
determination of definite “conflict triggers”. This does 
not mean prevention is impossible, of course, but it 
limits the efficacy of “early warning systems”. The arti-
cle then looks more specifically at the “four crimes” 
within R2P’s purview and argues that the dynamics of 
these atrocities further limits the efficacy of preven-
tion; the decision to engage in mass atrocities is taken 
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in response to a perceived existential crisis whereby 
those who decide to engage in such acts consider their 
very existence to be in jeopardy. This, therefore, signif-
icantly limits the scope for leveraging the “internal” as-
pect of R2P—namely the responsibilities of the host 
state—as the decision to commit these acts is invaria-
bly born from a belief that no other option is available 
to the potential aggressors. This means, therefore, that 
the specifics of atrocity crime prevention places great 
emphasis on the operationalisation of the external di-
mension of R2P, namely the role of the international 
community. As argued, however, so long as the re-
sponse of the “international community” is essentially 
predicated on the political will of states, the efficacy of 
prevention in these areas will be limited. This is not be-
cause it is impossible to mobilise political will, but ra-
ther that at times the political disposition of the key 
states that determine the “international” response—
especially the P5—is to actually support the perpetra-
tor, or just ignore the victims, due to a lack of national 
interest. The problem inhibiting effective preventative 
action is, therefore, the structural conflation of politics 
and law-enforcement which R2P does not in any way 
address.  
2. The Responsibility to Prevent 
From its inception R2P has emphasised the importance 
of prevention. In its 2001 report The Responsibility to 
Protect, the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) described prevention as 
“the single most important dimension of the responsi-
bility to protect” (2001a, p. xi). In recent years the “re-
sponsibility to prevent” has been increasingly lauded in 
similar terms as both the most important and most vi-
able aspect of R2P; in 2009 UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon stated that the “the ultimate purpose of the 
responsibility to protect [is] to save lives by preventing 
the most egregious mass violations of human rights” 
(2009, p. 28). Likewise Alex Bellamy, Director of the 
Asia Pacific Centre on R2P stated, “R2P has real value 
precisely because it has the potential to improve the 
prevention of mass atrocities and protection of vulner-
able populations” (2015, p. 26). According to Simon 
Adams, Director of the Global Center for R2P, “R2P is 
primarily a preventive doctrine” (2013, p. 1), a senti-
ment echoed by Gareth Evans, co-chair of the original 
ICISS (2009, p. 79). Indeed, by 2011 R2P had, according 
to Thomas Weiss, a “virtually exclusive emphasis on 
prevention” (2011, p. 1). 
Clearly there is a link between responding to intra-
state mass atrocities and preventing them; it stands to 
reason that any strategy aimed at reducing the damage 
caused by intra-state mass atrocities would naturally 
promote the prevention of these conflicts. Yet, R2P 
very definitely emerged from a concern about response 
rather than prevention; the impetus for the establish-
ment of the ICISS was the question posed by Kofi An-
nan in the wake of the controversy surrounding NATO’s 
1999 intervention in Kosovo; “if humanitarian interven-
tion is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—
to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
affect every precept of our common humanity?” (ICISS, 
2001a, p. vii). The ICISS described its report as a “re-
sponse to this challenge” and indeed in the first sen-
tence of the report described The Responsibility to Pro-
tect as  
about the so-called “right of humanitarian interven-
tion”; the question of when, if ever, it is appropri-
ate for states to take collective—and in particular 
military—action, against another state for the pur-
pose of protecting people at risk in that other state. 
(ICISS, 2001a, p. vii) 
Later the report notes, “The ‘responsibility to protect’ 
implies above all else a responsibility to react to situa-
tions of compelling need for human protection” (ICISS, 
2001a, p. 29). The genesis and remit was, therefore, 
clear; improving the international community’s capaci-
ty to react to intra-state mass atrocities.  
Given this, some have argued that the increased fo-
cus on prevention is a form of evasion and/or a mis-
guided distraction from the key issue of reaction 
(Chandler, 2009; Hehir, 2012, pp. 103-116). Indeed, 
Weiss described the emphasis on prevention as “pre-
posterous” and “a superficially attractive but highly un-
realistic way to try and pretend that we can finesse the 
hard issues of what essentially amounts to humanitari-
an intervention”. The concern with prevention, he 
claimed, “obscures the essence of the most urgent part 
of the spectrum of responsibility, to protect those 
caught in the crosshairs of war” (Weiss, 2007, p. 104). 
Beyond this question of the contested importance 
of prevention within R2P, the actual added value of the 
Responsibility to Prevent has been the source of some 
debate. Research into, and calls for greater focus on, 
prevention existed prior to the emergence of R2P; the 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 
for example, was established in 1994 and had pub-
lished some 26 reports, ten books and the landmark 
study Preventing Deadly Conflict prior to the ICISS re-
port. UN Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjöld, Pérez 
de Cuéllar, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan had 
each championed prevention as a key goal of the or-
ganisation and catalysed a plethora of studies on pre-
vention (Miall, 2004).  
The premise that preventing mass atrocities is pref-
erable to responding to them is conceptually sound in 
terms of the preferential relative costs—in financial 
and humanitarian terms—of the former over the latter 
(Fein, 2009, pp. 321-322; ICISS, 2001b, p. 27; OSA-
PGR2P, 2014, p. 2). This has long been asserted and is, 
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indeed, a contention with an empirical basis estab-
lished before the advent of R2P (Carnegie Commission 
on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).  
The ICISS report’s recommendations on prevention 
do not especially advance these reflections on preven-
tion; the prescriptions are quite vague and no more 
than a restatement of existing orthodoxy. Indeed, Bel-
lamy described the ICISS’s analysis and prescriptions on 
prevention as “brief, confused and unoriginal” and he 
recommended they be re-written (Bellamy, 2009, pp. 
52-53). Likewise, Weiss dismissed the ICISS recommen-
dations as “mumbling and stammering” (Weiss, 2007, 
p. 104). Michael Newman, in fact, claimed ICISS paid 
“inadequate attention to prevention” (2009, p. 190). 
Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the final 2005 World Sum-
mit Outcome Document (United Nations, 2005) recog-
nised a variant of R2P and a third—Paragraph 140—
recognised the Office of the Special Adviser on the Pre-
vention of Genocide. Paragraph 138 mentions preven-
tion—noting, “This responsibility entails the prevention 
of such crimes, including their incitement, through ap-
propriate and necessary means”—but there is little be-
yond this single acknowledgment. Neither the 2001 
ICISS report nor the World Summit Outcome Docu-
ment, therefore, advanced detailed, or novel, recom-
mendations on how to operationalise preventative 
measures and do not constitute a source of guidance 
for policymakers seeking to craft new preventative ini-
tiatives; indicatively the UK Government’s “Building 
Stability Overseas Strategy”—which aims to “improve 
our ability to anticipate instability and potential triggers 
for conflict”—does not mention R2P (UK, 2012, p. 2). 
The increased focus on prevention within R2P be-
gan to receive its most coherent stimulus in 2009 when 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon published his re-
port Implementing the Responsibility to Protect which 
stressed the centrality of prevention to R2P (2009, p. 
10). Since then the UN Secretary General has published 
annual reports on R2P with the 2010 and 2013 reports 
focused specifically on the issue of prevention. The 
prescriptions in these reports have been accompanied 
by publications from the Offices of the Special Adviser 
on the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility to 
Protect (OSAPGR2P), particularly its 2014 “Framework 
of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes”. These reports, there-
fore, constitute the most comprehensive and official 
treatment of the responsibility to prevent and form the 
primary sources for the forthcoming analysis.  
3. Is Prevention Possible? 
Investigations into how to prevent conflict predate the 
emergence of R2P and there are myriad books, articles, 
and reports across many disciplines which have ad-
vanced various recommendations. R2P deals with a 
particular set of “four crimes” however, and thus, is 
orientated towards a specific type of prevention. The 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document stipulated 
that R2P is concerned with genocide, war crimes, eth-
nic cleansing and crimes against humanity. These 
atrocity crimes are, it has been suggested, of a gravity, 
nature and genesis which makes the determination of 
how best to prevent them different to studies on gen-
eral conflict prevention (Bellamy, 2011a). Indicatively, 
in his 2010 report Ban Ki-Moon noted, “Preventing the 
incitement or commission of one of the four proscribed 
crimes or violations is not necessarily the equivalent of 
preventing the outbreak of armed conflict” (2010, p. 4).  
This does not mean, however, that the prevention 
of these crimes bears no relation to the prevention of 
conflict; the two are certainly linked on a number of 
levels. Rather, atrocity crimes comprise dynamics 
which, as discussed in later sections, though stemming 
from the same broad framework of conflict prevention, 
are characterised by particular features and related 
imperatives for those concerned with preventing them. 
Thus, while “atrocity prevention” and “conflict preven-
tion” are not synonymous, they are certainly related, 
and this is reflected in the Responsibility to Prevent lit-
erature. This poses an initial difficulty for the efficacy 
of the Responsibility to Prevent in so far as determining 
strategies for effective prevention—whether in terms 
of conflict or atrocity—is hampered by causal indeter-
minacy.  
By definition discussions on improving prevention 
occur in the context of a failure to prevent; there is lit-
tle need to agonise over ways to prevent things which 
do not happen. This creates an initial problem insofar 
as the discussion tends to focus on failures; “success-
ful” prevention is often un-noticed or at least unher-
alded. As Payam Akhavan noted in the context of the 
OSAPGR2P, “The Special Adviser has a thankless job. 
His success in early warning and prevention is neces-
sarily measured in terms of what does not happen” 
(2005, p. 11). That which “does not happen” invariably 
tends not to be acclaimed of course. In this sense, we 
are often simply not aware of the countless conflicts 
and atrocities which have not occurred, which have 
been successfully prevented. We can of course point to 
certain cases where there is widespread agreement 
that a looming conflict was prevented—the United Na-
tions Preventative Deployment mission stationed on the 
Macedonian/Serbian border from 1992 to 1999 is often 
cited in this regard (Stamnes, 2005)—but such claims are 
by definition counterfactual. There is, therefore, by ne-
cessity, a degree of indeterminacy regarding what par-
ticular policies or actions successfully prevented conflicts 
or mass atrocities. As noted by the ICISS, “There are only 
a few unambiguous examples of successful preventative 
diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, while the catalogue 
of failed preventative action and missed opportunity is 
lengthy” (2001b, p. 27). Thus, the capacity to learn 
from these successes is limited. 
This problem regarding the paucity of established 
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success templates relates to a more pervasive problem 
with prevention; identifying catalysts for conflict 
and/or atrocity commission is far from exact. Conflict 
can hardly be said to occur in a vacuum and while 
there are certain well established enabling conditions, 
there are so many that prescriptions become invariably 
vague. Clearly, conflict and atrocities do not occur in 
societies where there is social harmony; suggesting 
that disharmony constitutes fertile ground for their 
outbreak, however, does not lend itself to establishing 
focused preventative proposals. Indicatively, to miti-
gate the occurrence of the societal tensions that could 
lead to violence the ICISS recommended that states 
should implement a number of policies including,  
A firm national commitment to ensuring fair treat-
ment and fair opportunities for all citizens….Efforts 
to ensure accountability and good governance, pro-
tect human rights, promote social and economic 
development and ensure a fair distribution of re-
sources (ICISS, 2001a, p. 19).  
These are quite clearly very expansive prescriptions, in-
corporating an array of issues which arguably stretch 
the scope of “preventative” action to such an extent 
that they lose coherence and focus. Likewise, in outlin-
ing what he describes as “structural policy options” de-
signed to ameliorate the outbreak of conflict, Ban Ki-
Moon’s prescriptions on the Responsibility to Prevent 
in 2013 similarly include an immense range of guide-
lines; 
history has shown that building societies that are 
resilient to atrocity crimes reinforces State sover-
eignty and increases prospects for peace and stabil-
ity. Building resilience implies developing appropri-
ate legal frameworks and building State structures 
and institutions that are legitimate, respect interna-
tional human rights law and the rule of law in gen-
eral, and that have the capacity to address and de-
fuse sources of tension before they escalate. It 
means building a society which accepts and values 
diversity and in which different communities coex-
ist peacefully (2013, p. 2).  
These may well be laudable goals but they are clearly 
vague and vast; what is being suggested here amounts 
to the universal promotion of democracy, judicial im-
partiality and good governance. Thus, the normative 
society advanced as a means to realise the Responsibil-
ity to Prevent comprises constitutional and institutional 
components that by definition imbue the prescriptions 
with a political and ideological flavour that mitigates 
against consensus and strays into the micro-
management of intra-state politics (Lund, 2004, p. 124; 
Welsh, 2010, p. 153). In addition, the absence of one or 
more of these normative features of good governance 
does not guarantee conflict; as Ban Ki-moon noted, 
“The presence of risk factors does not directly or inevi-
tably cause atrocity crimes. Societies can exhibit multi-
ple sources of risk but not experience atrocity crimes” 
(2013, p. 4). Thus, it cannot be authoritatively stated 
that the absence of these features leads to conflict, just 
that it could. The OSAPGR2P’s analysis of the occur-
rence of atrocity crimes confirms this noting that many 
states exhibit “the presence of most of the risk factors, 
but atrocity crimes have not yet taken place” (OSA-
PGR2P, 2014, p. 6). 
If the Responsibility to Prevent is presented as a 
means to address the factors which can potentially 
lead to conflict and/or atrocity crimes, then it will ar-
guably face dealing with an eclectic range of issues be-
yond the feasible scope of any single concept. For ex-
ample, the range of enabling factors which contributed 
to the mass atrocities in Darfur from 2003–2008, in-
cludes inequitable farming practices and global warm-
ing (De Waal, 2007; Faris, 2007); can R2P realistically 
advance prescriptions on how to manage agricultural 
practices in Africa and tackle global warming without 
diluting its focus on mass atrocity prevention? 
This also highlights a problem with the very idea 
that early warning systems constitutive a means of 
preventing conflict. Like the maxim that prevention is 
preferable to response, the notion that we should im-
prove early warning systems is difficult to reject. This 
has become one of the dominant themes of the Re-
sponsibility to Prevent; Paragraph 138 of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document pledged states to 
“support the United Nations in establishing an early 
warning capability” and the Secretary General’s reports 
focus much attention on the need to improve early 
warning capacity within the UN. Yet, given the array of 
potential factors that could lead to the outbreak of 
conflict or the commission of atrocities, early warning 
systems arguably have an invidious remit; the list of 
warning signs is potentially infinite if one accepts that 
corruption, underdevelopment, disease, global warm-
ing, poor education, and many other factors contribute 
to the escalation of societal tensions. The problem fac-
ing those advocating prevention is, therefore, that the 
array of possible triggers is so vast, warnings, if issued 
at all, can be inherently speculative and thus lacking in 
imminence. As Henry Huttenbach warned, “…the capa-
bility to predict wars, civil strife and revolutions, let 
alone specific genocides, with any kind of reasonable, 
rational certitude escapes even the most knowledgea-
ble” (2008, p. 472). There is a rich body of literature re-
flecting on past atrocities with a view to determining 
the key catalysts and warning signs; the results are cer-
tainly instructive but far from homogenous (Goldstone 
et al., 2010; Harff, 2003; Held, 2009; Straus, 2007). This 
is further accentuated by the fact that R2P is con-
cerned with “four crimes”—genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing—which 
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each have very different definition’s and catalysts, and 
thus the scale and scope of possible warning signs is 
enormous.  
Additionally, certain crises have erupted in an ex-
tremely short period of time without previously exhib-
iting any notable warning signs (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 7). 
The crisis in Libya in 2011 is an obvious example; as 
noted by Bellamy,  
None of the world’s various risk-assessment 
frameworks viewed the country as posing any sort 
of threat of mass atrocities. Neither was a conﬂict 
widely anticipated. For example, CrisisWatch, the 
early-warning arm of the International Crisis Group, 
did not even mention Libya in its report of February 
2011, and did not issue a “conﬂict risk alert” until 
after the conﬂict had actually erupted (Bellamy, 
2011b, p. 4).  
The underlying cause of this conflict clearly related to 
the plight of those who had suffered under Gaddafi’s 
regime for so long—which certainly had been flagged 
by human rights organisations (Amnesty International, 
2010; Human Rights Watch, 2011)—but the means by 
which this could have been mitigated—such as rec-
ommended by Ban Ki-Moon in 2013—simply could not 
have been applied in February 2011. As Jennifer Welsh, 
the UN Special Adviser on R2P, accepts, “Structural or 
root-cause prevention strategies would have had little 
to say about this particular country” (2011, p. 7). One 
can certainly argue that the appropriate time to deal 
with the underlying causes of popular disquiet in Libya 
was five, ten or even twenty years earlier, but if this 
line of argument is adhered to then prevention be-
comes a call not just for universal democratisation, but 
for a near-revolution in international politics in terms 
of inter-state relations.  
Continuing with Libya as the example, after de-
commissioning his stockpiles of weapons of mass de-
struction in 2003, Gaddafi was rehabilitated in the in-
ternational community; trade with Libya increased, 
states openly sold arms to Libya, and the country’s no-
torious jails were used in the network of venues in-
volved in the extraordinary rendition process (Black, 
2009; Open Society Foundation, 2013). If, as is clear, 
Gaddafi’s regime was supported by the outside world 
and, as a result, enabled to engage in the very domes-
tic oppression which led to the mass uprisings and re-
sultant violence in 2011, then a causal link can be made 
between the policies of say the UK, France and Italy 
towards Libya and the crisis within the state in 2011 
(Amnesty International, 2012). Yet, surprisingly little 
attention is paid to the deleterious role played by ex-
ternal actors in fomenting internal disaffection in the 
official reports on the Responsibility to Prevent. Nei-
ther of Ban Ki-Moon’s reports, for example, recom-
mend that states stop selling arms to, or trade with, 
despotic regimes, despite this being a causal factor in 
the explosion of popular unrest across the Middle East 
in 2011 (PAX, 2015; Smith, 2011). The OSAPGR2P’s 
2014 report does briefly mention this; it lists “Armed, 
financial, logistic, training or other support of external 
actors, including States, international or regional or-
ganizations, private companies, or others” as one of 
the eight “indicators” under “Risk Factor 5: Capacity to 
Commit Atrocity Crimes” (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 14). 
There are a total of 14 Risk factors in the report each 
with between six and eighteen “indicators”; the one 
mention of negative external influence in the report is, 
therefore, relatively minimal.  
The narrative on prevention thus often coheres 
with a particular view of intra-state crises which ne-
glects to recognise the part played by the external in 
creating internal problems (Orford, 2003, p. 85). The 
situation is thus often framed in binary terms with a 
sharp distinction between the internal and the exter-
nal; intra-state crises are invariably framed in exclu-
sively endogenous terms with little or no references to 
exogenous causes (Collins, 2002; Williams, 2005, p. 
113). Kofi Annan’s 2006 report on related issues did 
note the negative role played by external actors in es-
calating intra-state societal tensions, but such warnings 
were not made in the context of Ban Ki-Moon’s prescrip-
tions on the Responsibility to Prevent (Annan, 2006, p. 
28). This of course presupposes two things; that external 
forces are not a causal factor in the occurrence of inter-
nal crises, and that a greater role for external actors is 
axiomatically a good thing; research suggests, particular-
ly in the context of the preventative measures taken 
with respects to Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, that 
this is not always the case (Jones, 1995, p. 226; Wheeler, 
2002, p. 214). Indeed, the ICISS acknowledged, “…when 
sustained measures have been undertaken, results have 
been mixed” (ICISS, 2001b, p. 27). 
While this section has highlighted some potential 
problems related to prevention it has not sought to 
suggest that prevention is impossible. Rather the inten-
tion has been to demonstrate that while conflict pre-
vention and atrocity prevention are different, both suf-
fer the same problems of causal diffusion, 
indeterminacy and potential causal bias. This does not 
render prevention strategies inherently flawed or im-
potent but must temper expectations as to the poten-
tial efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent. Building 
on these initial reflections, the following sections as-
sess the particularities of atrocity prevention to high-
light a further problem related to the Responsibility to 
Prevent, namely the centrality of political will.  
4. “Triggering Factors” 
Mass atrocities invariably involve acts of sadism and 
wanton violence, but they are not the product of a 
flash of madness in the way a random act of violence 
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may well be. By their very nature mass atrocities are, 
as perverse as it may seem, calculated and the product 
of careful deliberation (Howard, 1984, pp. 14-15). As 
Bellamy notes, “…mass atrocities tend to be rational, 
intentional and organized…it is actually quite difficult 
to persuade people to inflict harm intentionally on 
others” (2015, p. 29). Those who commit mass atroci-
ties have clearly determined that their interests are 
best served if they resort to extreme violence; such 
acts are not committed on a whim or accidentally, 
however callous the act itself may be. 
The decision to engage in such acts also cannot be 
born from an ignorance either of the legal prescriptions 
against such violence or the moral illegitimacy of sys-
tematic slaughter. In certain cases atrocities are, of 
course, carried out after a period of dehumanisation—
whereby a target group is cast as sub-human as oc-
curred most notably with respects to the Tutses prior 
to the Rwandan genocide (Hintjens, 1999)—but invari-
ably the authorisation of atrocity committal will be 
from actors aware of the humanity of their victims.  
This, therefore, enables a distinction to be made 
between conflict prevention and atrocity prevention; in 
the course of a conflict the warring parties seek mili-
tary victory; atrocities—particularly ethnic cleansing, 
systemic crimes against humanity, and genocide—
however, involve a determination to eliminate—either 
through extermination or expulsion—a perceived foe. 
Rather than stemming from strategic calculations 
based on a desire to achieve particular material aims, 
these crimes are calculated to inflict particular harm to 
individuals and thus “affect the core dignity of human 
beings” (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 1). Atrocities stem from 
underlying enabling factors which overlap with those 
related to conflict but, crucially, the decision to engage 
in a mass atrocity is different to the decision to engage 
in conflict; the latter may be born from a desire for 
greater material wealth, territory, or political change, 
whereas the former emerges from a sense of existen-
tial threat, invariably impelled by a particular catalyst 
described in the OSAPGR2P’s report on prevention as 
“triggering factors” (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 3). The OSA-
PGR2P defines these “triggering factors” as “unpredict-
able events or circumstances [that] aggravate condi-
tions or spark a sudden deterioration in a situation, 
prompting the perpetration of atrocity crimes” (OSA-
PGR2P, 2014, p. 17).  
Those atrocities committed in the post-Cold War 
era which have generated the most international revul-
sion, such as in Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica (1995), Dar-
fur (2003–2008), and Syria (2011–2015), have been 
undertaken by groups/actors who considered their vic-
tims to constitute an existential threat which had to be 
eliminated. The decision to plan a mass atrocity in each 
case preceded some political trauma; in the Rwandan 
case the shooting down of President Habyarimana’s 
plane on April 6th provided the catalysts for the Hutu to 
initiate the genocide; the violence in Srebrenica was 
the most horrific massacre to occur in the break-up of 
the former Yugoslavia but it certainly wasn’t the first. It 
occurred in the context of the savage escalation in 
identity-based violence which began in 1991 during 
which ethnic identity became a political fissure and the 
basis upon which new territories were demarcated; the 
conflict in Darfur had a long history but attacks by the 
Sudanese Liberation Army against government military 
installations in February 2003 led to the subsequent 
government-led brutal campaign; in Syria the turning 
point occurred in late March early April when the pro-
testors changed their demands from reform to the 
overthrow of Assad’s regime. This was accompanied by 
a series of violent incidents such as the burning down 
of the Baath Party headquarters in Daraa on 20th 
March and the killing of 7 policemen. The chances of 
dissuading the perpetrators from committing the 
atrocities was always minimal once the Rubicon of “ex-
istential threat” had been crossed. 
Determining when this catalyst or “triggering point” 
will occur is, by definition, extremely difficult; as noted 
by the OSAPGR2P, “Triggering factors are not always 
predictable and a strong mitigating factor might weak-
en or disappear” (OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 6). Thus the 
timeframe for, and potential efficacy of, preventative 
action was limited in each case. This means that the 
more holistic approaches advocated—as discussed 
above—were highly unlikely to have any traction dur-
ing the period after the political trauma and before the 
commission of mass atrocities. Certainly, ideas related 
to education, employment, inter-communal dialogue 
etc. are far too long-term to have had any meaningful 
effect at this stage. Thus “Pillar I” namely the “internal” 
dimension of the Responsibility to Prevent—the host 
state’s responsibility to protect its people from harm 
(Ki-Moon, 2009, p. 10)—is of limited effectiveness; the 
key, therefore, to preventing the commission of mass 
atrocities once an existential threat has been evoked is 
operationalising Pillars II and III, namely the external 
aspect (Ki-Moon, 2009, p. 15). Those about to engage 
in the commission of mass atrocities are likely to be 
dissuaded from doing so only by external actors.  
4.1. The External Dimension 
Reduced to its most basic components, prevention—in 
the context of mass atrocity crimes—involves external 
actors dissuading—possibly through coercive means—
those planning to commit a mass atrocity from execut-
ing their plans. Naturally, if a group plans to commit a 
mass atrocity and then, through a process of exclusive-
ly internal deliberation, decides that this plan is no 
longer appropriate, there is no need for preventative 
action.  
Prevention is thus by definition predicated on dis-
suading an agent from taking a particular course of ac-
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tion and thus, it involves a bi-lateral dynamic. There 
are, therefore, two actors against whom the responsi-
bility to prevent is leveraged; the group(s) planning the 
attacks and the external actor(s)—the “international 
community”—implored to prevent the attacks. This 
coheres with the internal and the external dimension 
of R2P which is central to the concept as reflected in 
the UN Secretary General’s “Three Pillars” of R2P (Ki-
Moon, 2009, p. 2). Both internal and external agents 
decide what action to take on the basis of a series of 
factors which determine the potential efficacy of pre-
ventative action.  
Those committing mass atrocities clearly believe it 
is both in their interests and within their capacity to 
undertake a mass atrocity (Valentino, 2005, pp. 66-91). 
In terms of the latter, no group will plan to engage in a 
mass atrocity crime if it determines that in so doing 
their own situation will deteriorate. The decision to use 
force in this way is, therefore, logically born from a 
sense of capacity. Of course, not all actors with the ca-
pacity to commit atrocities against their enemies do 
commit these acts; while this is a necessary condition it 
is not an automatic trigger.  
This rational calculation also means, therefore, that 
many groups which may actually want to commit mass 
atrocities are dissuaded from so doing simply because 
they calculate that the consequences would be, on bal-
ance, deleterious. There are, however, some cases 
where groups have, ostensibly, engaged in forms of vi-
olence designed to actually increase their own oppres-
sion, at least in the short term. Alan Kuperman has 
suggested that groups such as the Kosovo Liberation 
Army and the Sudanese Liberation Army engaged their 
respective enemies in such a way as to provoke them 
into committing atrocities against their people which 
would both galvanise their own communities and, 
more importantly, compel the international community 
to intervene on their behalf (Kuperman, 2006; for an 
opposing view see, Bellamy & Williams, 2012). In these 
cases, therefore, though the strategy employed is actu-
ally designed to accentuate the group’s own suffering in 
the short term, the logic is ultimately that they will pre-
vail with the aid of external support, and thus the bal-
ance of consequences remains a determining logic.  
With respects to the means by which external 
agents can exercise leverage on potential perpetrators 
of mass atrocities, the key period is the immediate af-
termath of the catalyst or “trigger point”, when the 
cost-benefit analysis is undertaken; it is during this 
phase that coordinated international pressure is most 
effective and most needed. The decision not to commit 
an atrocity once an existential crisis is deemed to per-
tain, is therefore, dependent on altering the balance of 
consequences calculation so that committing the atroc-
ity will be perceived as imprudent (rather than simply 
illegal or immoral). By definition the crimes R2P is ori-
entated towards involve one party of vastly superior 
strength targeting another; this means that these 
crimes derive from a balance of consequences deci-
sion-making process which favours the latter. The 
means by which the costs of committing an atrocity are 
increased to the point where to undertake such acts 
would be manifestly self-defeating, derives from the 
positions taken by the international community and 
thus the leverage exercised by external actors is a func-
tion of political will. This has profound consequences 
for the Responsibility to Prevent. The problem is, the 
means by which this “international” action is coordi-
nated and operationalised is essentially state-based 
and ultimately dependent on the P5.  
While R2P has been presented by many of its advo-
cates as revolutionary (Feinstein, 2007) and an idea 
“that has begun to change the world” (Bellamy, 2015, 
p. 111), it has actually not led to, nor has it sought to 
impel, any change to the existing international legal 
order. R2P is a restatement of existing laws—each of 
the “four crimes” were illegal long before R2P (Focarel-
li, 2008; Stahn, 2007)—and, perhaps more significantly, 
seeks to work with rather than alter the process by 
which these laws are enforced (Bellamy, 2015, p. 14; 
Evans, 2008, p. 137). This means in practice that the 
concept recognises the powers vested in the Security 
Council and does not involve, or propose, any institu-
tional change (Davies & Bellamy, 2014).  
International human rights law is extensive in its 
scope but this comprehensive remit is undermined by 
the process by which it is enforced. While international 
law establishes a range of inviolable human rights, in 
practice this system is based on self-regulation (Fitz-
maurice, 2014, p. 182). State’s essentially police them-
selves with respects to their adherence to the human 
rights laws they commit themselves to abide by (Hen-
kin, 1990, p. 250). The only viable means by which the 
state’s adherence to international human rights law 
can be coercively enforced is through Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter; this requires the consent of the Securi-
ty Council and thus the veto power of the P5 becomes 
a key barrier to the enforcement of human rights law. 
Other UN bodies—such as the Human Rights Council 
and the High Commissioner for Human Rights—may is-
sue recommendations and condemnations but they do 
not have the power to enforce compliance or punish 
criminality (Mertus, 2009, p. 34). This, indeed, is reflect-
ed in the OSAPGR2P’s overview of international law on 
human rights and atrocity prevention (2014, pp. 1-3).  
In a functioning domestic political system individu-
als obey the law either because they agree with the 
law or they fear punishment if they do commit a crime 
(Hurrell, 2005, p. 16). Thus, even if the moral convic-
tion that murder is wrong is lacking, an individual faces 
considerable disincentives to kill, in the form of retro-
spective punishment meted out by the police and judi-
ciary. If however the judicial system, police and gov-
ernment are corrupt, and the individual believes s/he 
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can escape punishment, then, provided s/he has no 
moral qualms about committing murder, a perceived 
need arises, and the potential murderer calculates that 
s/he has the capacity to undertake this action, then the 
chances that such an act will be committed naturally 
increase. This is, essentially analogous to the situation 
which pertains at present in international politics, a 
situation R2P has not remedied. 
In the context of the Responsibility to Prevent, the 
manner in which preventative influence is exercised is 
largely dependent on the assent of the P5. In his 2010 
report Ban outlined how Responsibility to Prevent 
would be operationalised;  
When the Special Advisers, based largely on infor-
mation provided by, and in consultation with, other 
United Nations entities, conclude that a situation 
could result in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleans-
ing or crimes against humanity, they provide early 
warning to me and, through me, to the Security 
Council (2010, pp. 7-8). 
Thus while reform of the early warning mechanism 
would ensure that warnings would be expedited more 
rapidly through the UN system, ultimately these re-
ports would be placed before the Security Council for 
its consideration. Here politics invariably takes over; as 
Francis Deng stated when he was OSAPG, “every time 
an issue is brought to the Security Council you can pre-
dict how Russia, China and the others will vote” (Hehir, 
2012, p. 223). The Secretary-General also notes the po-
tential role of Regional Organisation acting through 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter but again, while these 
bodies do not comprise a veto-wielding P5, they are 
state-based and cannot be said to be immune from the 
influence of political interests.  
The only actual institutional innovation initiated in 
the context of the emergence of the Responsibility to 
Prevent is the creation of the Office of the Special Ad-
viser on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) in July 
20041 (Annan, 2004, p. 2). The OSAPG was heralded by 
some as a potentially significant innovation and indica-
tive of the new importance afforded to prevention 
(Hamburg, 2008, p. 226; Ramcharan, 2008, p. 180). Yet, 
in addition to being allocated a paltry budget (Deng, 
2010) the mandate of the OSAPG was, and remains, 
heavily restricted and the capacity of the adviser to act 
independently was consciously circumscribed by the 
Security Council during the drafting of the OSAPG’s 
mandate (Hehir, 2010, 2011). This has meant that 
though a new office was created with a specific remit 
to work on the prevention of genocide, the institution-
al distribution of power within the UN was unaltered. 
                                                          
1 The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Geno-
cide merged with the Office of the Special Adviser on R2P in 
2011 
This coheres with the findings of the ICISS who noted, 
that while states had often lauded the importance of 
prevention these declarations, “…have not, however, 
been matched by an equal commitment by member 
states to build UN preventative capacities” (ICISS, 
2001b, p. 29) 
This all means in practice that a state which com-
mits, or plans to commit, an atrocity crime can be 
shielded from external censure if they happen to have 
an ally amongst the P5; as Deng noted, whenever a cri-
sis is brought to the P5, “you are going to get one 
member or another of the P5 to defend that country” 
(Hehir, 2012, p. 224). The case of Syria is illustrative 
here; once the rebel forces threatened the very exist-
ence of Assad’s regime in March/April 2011 it clearly 
constituted an existential crisis for Assad personally 
and the regime around him. In determining how to re-
spond Assad would have known that the tactics he 
came to employ were illegal; it is implausible that he 
was unaware when planning his violent response that 
the tactics he aimed to employ would involve breaking 
international law. Yet, in determining whether or not 
to commit these atrocity crimes he will certainly have 
been influenced by the fact that Russia has a perma-
nent seat on the Security Council and thus the capacity 
to veto any proposed international censure. Thus, in 
terms of the external dimension of the Responsibility 
to Prevent a key means of dissuading Assad from en-
gaging in mass atrocity crimes—namely the fear of ex-
ternal censure—was much less potent. Illustratively, on 
22nd May 2014 despite the appeals of the UN Secretary 
General and the UN Hugh Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Russia and China vetoed a proposal put to the 
Security Council to refer Assad to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC); the use of the veto in this case—
the fourth time it had been exercised by Russia and 
China in the course of the response to Syria—came as 
little surprise and once again highlighted the influence 
of politics on law enforcement. This constitutional con-
flation of politics and law enforcement clearly impacts 
on the efficacy of prevention; despite the ICC’s exist-
ence, if the determination as to who is tried there is a 
political rather than a judicial one, then its punitive po-
tential is a less effective deterrent than it could be.  
The institutional configuration of the UN, and spe-
cifically the powers vested in the P5, thus whilst not a 
causal factor in Assad’s decision to engage in mass 
atrocity crimes, constituted an enabling factor. In the 
same way we can say that Israel’s tactics towards Gaza 
in 2014 derived from a sense that though these actions 
were illegal they would be protected from punishment 
by the US at the Security Council. Of course, having an 
ally on the P5 does not shield a government from in-
ternational criticism; both Syria and Israel have been 
widely condemned by an array of actors from journal-
ists, to academics to UN officials and other states but, 
crucially, though this condemnation has surely been 
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unwelcome, it has not been sufficient to sway these 
states from engaging in their actions, as they consider 
them to be impelled by an existential threat.  
Thus, we can determine that those who decided to 
commit mass atrocities do so through a process of ra-
tional evaluation of the costs and benefits involved. 
Likewise, the international community’s disposition 
during the immediate pre-atrocity phase is determined 
on a similar cost-benefit basis. This helps explain, for 
example, the differing response of the international 
community to the cases of Libya and Syria in 2011. 
With respects to Libya the UN reacted with unusual 
speed; in the Security Council passed Resolution 1970 
on 26th February which sought to dissuade Gaddafi 
from engaging in mass atrocities. This was very clearly 
an attempt at preventative action employed only ten 
days after the situation began to rapidly deteriorate. 
Less than three weeks later on 17th March the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1973 with sanctioned the 
imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. In this case, the 
nature of the Gaddafi regime and regional geopolitics 
were more of a factor in determining the international 
response than the scale of human rights abuses taking 
place; if the UN Security Council acted only on the basis 
of the scale of the potential or actual suffering then the 
response to Syria would not have been as lamentable 
as it has proved (Hehir, 2013; Morris; 2013). Clearly the 
speed with which the Security Council passed resolution 
1970—aimed at preventing a mass atrocity—contrast 
sharply with the lamentable inaction and disunity which 
has characterised the Council’s response to Syria.  
The difference between Libya and Syria stemmed 
from the very different relationship between Libya and 
the international community, and Syria and the inter-
national community. The different response was essen-
tially a function of the fact that Gaddafi, unlike Assad, 
did not have powerful allies willing to shield him from 
external censure. Whilst, as noted earlier, Gaddafi had 
very definitely “come in from the cold” since decom-
missioning his weapons programme he remained an 
isolated figure, actively despised by many in the West, 
and indeed, the Middle East (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, 
pp. 841-842). Assad, however, though also a divisive 
figure in the Middle East, benefitted from the robust 
support of Russia.  
Thus, the leverage excised by the Responsibility to 
Prevent is heavily dependent on political will, as op-
posed to legal procedure and judicial oversight. This, 
severely restricts the efficacy of the Responsibility to 
Prevent as, to a great extent, the holistic approaches to 
conflict and atrocity prevention—which as discussed 
earlier are problematic in themselves—are ultimately 
of secondary importance to the political disposition of 
the great powers, a dynamic far less malleable than the 
measures advocated by Ban Ki-Moon. This is reflected 
in the literature on conflict prevention generally; as 
Bruce W. Jentleson observes, “Almost every study of 
conflict prevention concludes that when all is said and 
done, the main obstacle is the lack of political will” 
(2009, p. 293). The ICISS report itself noted, “It is pos-
sible to exaggerate the extent to which lack of early 
warning is a serious problem…lack of early warning is 
an excuse rather than an explanation, and the problem 
is not a lack of warning but of timely response” (2001a, 
p. 21). Thus while paragraph 138 of the Outcome Doc-
ument called for greater emphasis on early warning 
and Ban Ki-Moon called for greater sharing of infor-
mation on looming atrocities, these do not constitute 
solutions to the problem posed by the P5’s political 
approach to human rights law enforcement. Illustra-
tively, graphic reports on the deteriorating situation 
in Darfur were regularly brought to the Security 
Council’s attention from 2003 on, to little effect (Pe-
ters, 2009, p. 524). As Gregory Stanton succinctly ob-
servers, “Early warning is meaningless without early 
response” (2009, p. 319). Remedial action which did 
have a positive effect in Darfur was primarily the re-
sult of unilateral initiatives undertaken without the 
Security Council’s collective support (Deng, 2010; 
Mayroz, 2008, p. 366; Straus, 2005). The fact that 
many of these initiatives did have a positive effect—
USAID in particular has played a pro-active role in the 
region (USAID, 2015)—serves to further expose the 
Security Council’s ineffectiveness.  
Again, it is necessary to state that these institution-
al problems, though clearly of profound importance, do 
not mean preventative diplomacy can never be suc-
cessful. The problem is not that preventative action 
cannot work but rather that the primary means by 
which it can be effectively leveraged is compromised 
by competing national interests amongst the P5. Two 
examples regularly cited as evidence of successful pre-
ventative intervention are the international communi-
ty’s response to the crises in Ivory Coast in November 
2004 and Kenya in December 2007 (Ban Ki-Moon, 
2009, p. 24). In both cases the intervention of the then 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Special Ad-
viser on the Prevention of Genocide—Juan Méndez in 
2004 and Francis Deng in 2007—helped to diffuse an 
escalating crisis. In the same way, it is simply untrue to 
say that, owing to the structure of the UN, the interna-
tional community can never respond to actually occur-
ring humanitarian crises; at times the response to cri-
ses has been timely and robust. The problem, however, 
is that these cases are the exception. Owing to the ex-
isting legal system the more common response is “in-
humanitarian non-intervention” (Chesterman, 2003, p. 
54) namely a situation where, despite the obvious hu-
manitarian need, the lack of national interests amongst 
those with the capacity to act results in inaction. Pre-
cisely the same problem impacts on the efficacy of the 
responsibility to prevent; arguably more so given that 
calling preventative action is based on possible tragedy. 
As Weiss remarked,  
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 85-97 94 
Logically speaking if you can’t even get people mo-
bilised to do something in the midst of a crisis, the 
idea that somehow even before you have a crisis, 
they’re all going to align and put money into it 
seems to me to be against the nature of human be-
ings and certainly against the nature of the inter-
state system (Hehir, 2012, p. 112).  
The responsibility to prevent, as currently advanced, 
therefore, does not address the main obstacle to con-
sistent and effective preventative action; the state-
based nature of the international legal order and spe-
cifically, the powers vested in the P5. Without seeking 
to address this structural barrier the efficacy of the Re-
sponsibility to Prevent, will be limited.  
5. Conclusion 
Though initially catalysed by a perceived need to im-
prove the international community’s response to intra-
state crises, R2P has increasingly focused on preven-
tion. The “Responsibility to Prevent” indeed, has be-
come widely championed at the primary aim of R2P 
and the means by which the concept as a whole can 
have the greatest impact. This article has argued, how-
ever, that the future efficacy of the Responsibility to 
Prevent will be circumscribed by causal indeterminacy 
and the barrier presented by the constitutional config-
uration of the UN Security Council. 
Tackling looming crises naturally demands an un-
derstanding of how these crises emerge; the range of 
possible contributing factors is, however, so vast that 
this is arguably an unfeasibly onerous task which can at 
best only provide very general guidelines. Indicatively 
the ICISS urged the international community to tackle 
the “root causes” of internal conflict namely poverty, 
political repression and uneven distribution of resources 
(2001a, p. 22). Collectively addressing these three issues 
is clearly an enormous, if not impracticable, task (Lund, 
2004, p. 122). Advocating expansive holistic changes—
such as democratisation, impartial judiciaries, and equi-
table wealth distribution—constitutes an ideologically-
inspired agenda for the micro-management of intra-
state politics which is alienating—insofar as it will be 
perceived as political—as well as unfeasible.  
Aside even from the scale and political nature of 
these “preventative” measures it is not clear that there 
is actually a causal link between the oft-cited danger 
signs and the actual occurrence of atrocity crimes; as 
the OSAPGR2P accepted, “…it is impossible to draw a 
direct causal relation between the presence of particu-
lar risk factors and the occurrence of atrocity crimes” 
(OSAPGR2P, 2014, p. 7). Thus, we remain unable to au-
thoritatively determine causal patterns when it comes to 
identifying specific danger signs, and thus remain prey to 
the cumulative effect of case-specific exigencies.  
Additionally, simply noting that these features exist 
in a particular society does not in itself catalyse action. 
The UN’s enquiry into the Rwandan genocide certainly 
noted gaps and weaknesses with respects to early 
warning information sharing but ultimately concluded 
that the “fundamental failure” was “a persistent lack of 
political will” (Security Council, 1999, p. 3). As Ban Ki-
Moon noted, “…the crucial element in the prevention 
of genocide remains responding to concerns, once 
these have been communicated” (Human Rights Coun-
cil, 2009, p. 17). History suggests that political will is all 
too often lacking, especially with respects to preven-
tion which by definition seeks to mobilise action on the 
presumption that something might happen. In his 2014 
report the Secretary General lamented, 
there is still too little will to operationalize preven-
tion. This is manifest most clearly in the reluctance 
of States to place country situations on the agenda 
of regional or international organizations before 
they reach a crisis point. It is also reflected in the 
resource allocations of many Member States, which 
still prioritize crisis response (2014, p. 18). 
As R2P has not altered, or indeed sought to alter, the 
means by which the Security Council reacts to intra-
state crises—looming or actual—the structural barriers 
to effective and consistent action—manifest in the 
competing national interests of the P5—remain. The 
Responsibility to Prevent is left, therefore, largely de-
pendent upon the whims of particular states and thus 
prey to their often nefarious political interests.  
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